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ABSTRACT
Objective: To determine if individual undergraduate
schools of medicine in the UK and the Republic of
Ireland provide any teaching to medical students about
biological weapons, bioterrorism, chemical weapons
and weaponised radiation, if they perceive them to be
relevant issues and if they figure them in their future
plans.
Design: A cross-sectional study utilising an internet-
based questionnaire sent to key figures responsible for
leading on the planning and delivery of undergraduate
medical teaching at all schools of medicine in the UK
and Ireland.
Setting: All identified undergraduate schools of
medicine in the UK and Ireland between August 2012
and December 2012.
Outcome measures: Numerical data and free text
feedback about relevant aspects of undergraduate
teaching.
Results: Of the 38 medical schools approached,
34 (28 in UK, 6 in Ireland) completed the questionnaire
(89.47%). 4 (all in UK) chose not to complete it.
6/34 (17.65%) included some specific teaching on
biological weapons and bioterrorism. 7/34 (20.59%)
had staff with bioterrorism expertise (mainly in
microbiological and syndromic aspects). 4/34
(11.76%) had plans to introduce some specific
teaching on bioterrorism. Free text responses revealed
that some felt that because key bodies (eg, UK’s
General Medical Council) did not request teaching on
bioterrorism, then it should not be included, while
others regarded this field of study as a postgraduate
subject and not appropriate for undergraduates, or
argued that the curriculum was too congested already.
4/34 (11.76%) included some specific teaching on
chemical weapons, and 3/34 (8.82%) on weaponised
radiation.
Conclusions: This study provides evidence that
at the present time there is little teaching at the
undergraduate level in the UK and Ireland on the
subjects of biological weapons and bioterrorism,
chemical weapons and weaponised radiation and
signals that this situation is unlikely to change unless
there were to be high-level policy guidance.
INTRODUCTION
The United Nations has stated that ‘…terror-
ism continues to inﬂict pain and suffering on
people’s lives all over the world’ and ‘…
almost no week goes by without an act of ter-
rorism taking place somewhere in the
world’.1
In the USA, following the 9/11 terrorist
events of 2001, the Association of American
Medical Colleges urged medical schools
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▪ The response rate was very high.
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questions, and the reasons for this are not
known.
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across that country to ensure that medical students were
taught about biological weapons and bioterrorism and
how best to identify a potential terrorist attack.2 The
value of taking such steps was illustrated by the deliber-
ate release of anthrax in the USA in late 2001.3
A number of US medical schools have since included
such material into their curricula.4–8 In 2003, the
European Union stated that ‘Health authorities and
agencies have a crucial role here…’ and ‘…must…’
promote ‘…preparedness…’, ‘…create a capability for
the detection and identiﬁcation of biological and chem-
ical agents that might be used in attacks…’ and ‘…famil-
iarise clinicians with the syndromes to look out for’.9
In the UK, it was clear following the London suicide
bombings on 7 July 200510 that the possibility of further
terrorist incidents occurring at some time in the future
existed, and the potential for any such incidents involv-
ing bioterrorism has been considered,11 12 although in
2007 a major survey questioned the current degree of
preparedness of Accident and Emergency Departments
in the UK for such events.13 In the Republic of Ireland,
there has been high-level planning for dealing with the
consequences of bioterrorism.14
In addition to the risk of bioterrorism, the potential
for radiological terrorism such as polonium poisoning
and nuclear ‘dirty bombs’15 16 and events such as the
1995 deliberate release of the chemical weapon sarin in
the Tokyo subway ( Japan),17 the 2003 discovery in
London of the vegetable toxin ricin18 and the ricin-
containing letters sent to the US president and others in
201319 illustrate that risks exist in these areas too.
The United Nations takes weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) very seriously,20 and attention has already been
drawn to existing deﬁciencies in the education of scien-
tists, including life scientists, with respect to their back-
ground knowledge about and understanding of
bioterrorism and biowarfare, and how the research into
this ﬁeld is undertaken and the results disseminated
could impact upon this.21 In addition to their future
work as clinicians, medical graduates will form at least a
part of the research community working in this ﬁeld.
Accordingly, to establish whether issues related to WMD
such as bioterrorism agents, radiation-based weapons
and chemical weapons are currently being considered
by those responsible for organising and delivering
undergraduate medical teaching in the UK and Ireland,
and if the degree programmes they offer currently
include any time spent on these issues, a cross-sectional
survey has been undertaken of all medical schools in the
UK and the Republic of Ireland.
METHODS
A survey comprising nine questions was prepared using
the ‘Survey Monkey’ web site, a tool which facilitates the
construction of a questionnaire that can then easily be
emailed to recipients.22 The questionnaire was designed
for maximum clarity, and ﬁgure 1A, B shows the actual
original questionnaire, including its layout, that was sent
to the recipients. The speciﬁc questions posed to the
medical schools are both contained in the ﬁgures as well
as being listed in the Results section. Respondents were
not under any obligation to answer any or all of the
questions, or to provide free text responses.
All individually listed schools of medicine providing
undergraduate medical degree courses in the UK and
the Republic of Ireland were identiﬁed by visiting the
individual websites of all universities and Royal Colleges
in the two countries, and establishing whether they
offered such courses.
In August 2012, a hyperlink to the survey questionnaire
was sent by email to the persons identiﬁed from the inter-
net as being the Dean or equivalent person in charge of
undergraduate medical teaching at each of the identiﬁed
schools of medicine in the UK and the Republic of
Ireland (totalling 38: 32 in the UK and 6 in Ireland).
Depending upon whether or not replies were received, at
least three emails were sent out to the identiﬁed contacts
at each medical school. Emails were sent out from the
NHS email box of one of the authors (STG). The emails
invited the recipients to click on the hyperlink and to
look at the questionnaire and to complete and return it.
They were advised of the names, status and place of work
of the researchers. They were advised that it was intended
that the results would be published, and that they
had the option to choose anonymity for the institution.
A positive response from a respondent was, in itself, con-
sidered as the evidence of consent. The survey was termi-
nated in mid-December 2012.
Question 1 (ﬁgure 1A) of the questionnaire gave
undergraduate schools of medicine the choice of either
identifying the name of the medical school or remaining
anonymous. Beyond this, no assurances of anonymity
were given.
Questions 2–7 (ﬁgure 1A,B) dealt with bioterrorism.
Question 2 asked, in the present tense, if the organisa-
tion has included any speciﬁc teaching on bioterrorism.
If the answer to question 2 was no, question 3 explored
their future plans, asking if there were any plans in
place to introduce such teaching. Questions 4 and 5
asked, in the present tense, if certain areas of knowledge
were covered and if the organisation had speciﬁc teach-
ing experience in place to deliver such teaching.
Questions 5 and 6 were included to help establish
whether a decision should be made in the future to
include new teaching on bioterrorism, the necessary
expertise was already present among the existing teach-
ing staff. Opportunities were given within the question-
naire to provide free text replies, to allow for comments
to be made by the participants if they should wish to do
so. Such comments could, for example, provide insight
into the reasoning and motives behind the answers
given to the questions, and perhaps even provide wider
insights which had not hitherto been recognised, or
highlight if there had been any difﬁculty with interpret-
ing and answering the questions.
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Question 8 (ﬁgure 1B) asked about chemical weapons
and question 9 explored the issue of radiation utilised
for the purposes of aggression.
With respect to piloting, given that the aim of the
piloting process is to detect any ﬂaws in the questioning
and to correct these prior to the main survey being
started, the questionnaire was ﬁrst tested on a small
group of colleagues, which conﬁrmed that it was clearly
written in plain English, and was comprehensible.
This approach was preferred to going through a
formal pilot study as
▸ The objective of the survey was to obtain, if possible,
completed questionnaires from all medical schools;
▸ The overall target group (of medical schools) was
small;
▸ If a subgroup was to be subjected to a pilot study, and
those participants were then excluded from the main
study, this would have left an even smaller—and
incomplete—dataset.
Formal ethical approval was not considered necessary
and therefore not sought. This was because the survey
was considered to be more akin to a service review, with
no experimentation being involved, no sponsorship
being involved and no patients being involved or
approached. The sample under study was made up of
large mature well-resourced organisations, rather than
individual people.
RESULTS
Breakdown of respondents
Of a total of 38 undergraduate schools of medicine who
were contacted, 34 (89.47%) completed the question-
naire. A total of 28 were from the UK and 6 from the
Republic of Ireland. A total of 32 respondents provided
the name of their organisation. Of the remaining 6, 2
completed the questionnaire, but chose to remain
anonymous. Accordingly, there were 4 medical schools
Figure 1 (A) Part 1 of original questionnaire emailed to undergraduate schools of medicine. (B) Part 2 of original questionnaire
emailed to undergraduate schools of medicine.
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(all in the UK) which did not provide any information
for the study. The detailed breakdown is in table 1.
Because of subsequently receiving further informa-
tion, one undergraduate school of medicine asked for
its original response to be withdrawn and replaced with
a revised response, which was achieved.
Responses to questions relating to bioterrorism
These responses relate to questions 2–6 listed in the ori-
ginal questionnaire illustrated in ﬁgure 1A,B. The follow-
ing data were obtained from the 34 respondents.
Some respondents chose not to answer all the
questions.
1. ‘Does the undergraduate medical curriculum at your
university include any speciﬁc teaching on bioterror-
ism?’ A total of 6/34 (17.64%) replied yes, 28/34
(82.36%) replied no and 0/34 (0%) provided no
answer.
2. ‘If no—are there any plans to introduce any speciﬁc
teaching on bioterrorism?’ A total of 4/34 (11.76%)
replied yes, 25/34 (73.53%) replied no and 5/34
(14.71%) provided no answer.
3. ‘If yes—are the following areas of knowledge
covered?’ A total of 11/34 (32.35%) provided
answers and 23/34 (67.65%) provided no answers to
the following questions:
Table 1 Undergraduate Schools of Medicine approached breakdown of responders and non-responders
Number Names/location of medical schools
Total number of medical schools
approached in UK and Republic of
Ireland
38 32 in the UK (England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland)
6 in the Republic of Ireland
Completed questionnaire and provided
name—out of 32 UK medical schools
approached
26 of 32 Aberdeen (Scotland)
Birmingham (England)
Bristol (England)
Cardiff (Wales)
Dundee (Scotland)
Durham (England)
East Anglia (Norwich, England)
Edinburgh (Scotland)
Glasgow (Scotland)
Hull York (England)
Keele (Stoke-on-Trent, England)
Leeds (England)
Leicester (England)
London—Guy’s, King’s and Thomas’ (England)
London—Imperial College London (England)
London—St Georges, London (England)
London—University College London (England)
Manchester (England)
Newcastle-upon-Tyne (England)
Nottingham (England)
Oxford (England)
Peninsular (Exeter and Plymouth, England)
Sheffield (England)
Southampton (England)
Swansea (Wales)
Warwick (Coventry, England)
Completed questionnaire anonymously 2 of 32 N/A
Either responded anonymously, or
chose not to complete questionnaire
6 of 32 Brighton and Sussex (England)
Belfast (Northern Ireland)
Cambridge (England)
Liverpool (England)
London—Barts and the London (England)
St Andrews (Scotland)
Completed questionnaire and provided
name—out of 6 Republic of Ireland
medical schools approached
6 of 6 University College Cork
University College Dublin
Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland (Dublin)
Trinity College Dublin
National University of Ireland, Galway
University of Limerick
4 Green ST, Cladi L, Morris P, et al. BMJ Open 2013;3:e002744. doi:10.1136/bmjopen-2013-002744
Teaching medical undergraduates in the UK and Ireland about bioterrorism
▸ Policies and planning for bioterrorism and suspected
bioterrorism—1/11 replied yes.
▸ The microbiological and laboratory aspects of bioter-
rorism—7/11 replied yes.
▸ Recognising clinical syndromes associated with bioter-
rorism—8/11 replied yes.
▸ Health and safety in the hospital around caring for
possible cases of bioterrorism—5/11 replied yes.
▸ Public health issues around bioterrorism—2/11
replied yes.
▸ Legal and police issues in bioterrorism—1/11 replied
yes.
▸ Ethical issues in bioterrorism—3/11 replied yes.
▸ Public relations regarding bioterrorism—0/11 replied
yes.
▸ The imparting of information to the public regarding
bioterrorism and suspected bioterrorism—1/11
replied yes.
▸ Other declared areas of expertise—3/11 replied yes
(there were three free text responses, indicating that
teaching on torture and various relevant microorgan-
isms and clinical syndromes was provided—these are
listed in box 1).
5. ‘If yes—does your medical school have speciﬁc teach-
ing expertise available related to bioterrorism?’ A
total of 7/34 (20.59%) replied yes, 8/34 (23.53%)
replied no and 19/34 (55.88%) provided no answer.
6. ‘If yes—in what areas of expertise?’ A total of 7/34
(20.59%) provided answers and 27/34 (79.41%) pro-
vided no answers to the following questions:
▸ Policies and planning for bioterrorism and suspected
bioterrorism—3/7 replied yes.
▸ The microbiological and laboratory aspects of bioter-
rorism—5/7 replied yes.
▸ Recognising clinical syndromes associated with bioter-
rorism—4/7 replied yes.
▸ Health and safety in the hospital around caring for
possible cases of bioterrorism—2/7 replied yes.
▸ Public health issues around bioterrorism—1/7
replied yes.
▸ Legal and police issues in bioterrorism—1/7 replied
yes.
▸ Ethical issues in bioterrorism—2/7 replied yes.
▸ Public relations regarding bioterrorism—1/7 replied
yes.
▸ The imparting of information to the public regarding
bioterrorism and suspected bioterrorism—2/7
replied yes.
▸ Other declared areas of expertise—0/7 replied yes.
Free text responses relating to bioterrorism
These responses relate to question 7 listed in the ori-
ginal questionnaire illustrated in ﬁgure 1B, which states
that ‘If there is not currently any undergraduate teach-
ing on bioterrorism to medical students/student doctors
at your university, please explain why this is so’.
28/34 (82.35%) respondents provided free text
responses, the full list of which is in box 1.
Chemical weapons and radiation used for the purposes of
aggression
These responses relate to questions 8–9 listed in the ori-
ginal questionnaire illustrated in ﬁgure 1B.
1. ‘Does the undergraduate medical curriculum at your
university include any speciﬁc teaching on chemical
weapons, and their effect(s) on human health?’
Box 1 Complete list of free text replies to the question “If there is not currently any undergraduate teaching on bioterrorism
to medical students/student doctors at your university, please explain why this is so”
“Curriculum is full…”—“Less important in an overcrowded undergrad curriculum…”
“It’s not seen as a priority…”—“Pressure of other core areas…”—“Not seen as core…”
“Is this more of a postgraduate teaching subject?”
“It is not part of GMC requirements”—“Our curriculum covers the requirements of Tomorrow’s Doctors 2009…” “It is not part of the GMC
curriculum Tomorrows Doctors, and is not a common and important problem in the UK…”
“Recognition of infections that could arise through bioterrorism is not specifically covered at the undergraduate level…”—“…will be covered
for students attached to the Infectious Diseases unit (IDU). This is currently a student selected attachment and only about half the year
receive teaching on the IDU…”
“Whilst there is a theoretical possibility of a number of biological agents being used by terrorist groups, in reality the number of cases is
tiny, and even of these few attempts most have failed. The chances therefore of a doctor having to deal with a case are vanishingly small.
We do include possible terrorist use of Anthrax as a plenary topic…”
“Junior doctors would not be expected to cope with suspected cases unsupported…”
“To date this has not been considered in any substantial way…”—“Largely an oversight—it has featured in Year 1 PBL but not in a struc-
tured way and this survey has prompted us to review this”—“We have not been advised to include this teaching by our regulators or other
bodies but we would be happy to be contacted to discuss implementation if it was deemed necessary…”—“This is a subject which I have
often reflected upon but until now did not consider it as a valid component of our curriculum…”
“…it is naive and counterproductive to expect it to cover all aspects of importance within medicine…”
“There is an optional module on bioterrorism, but not considered essential core teaching…”
“We have no curricular materials readily available for this and I don’t believe any expert available who could produce those for us...”
“The first essential is to ensure we produce safe and empathic doctors. I am not sure how many bioterrorist attacks we have experienced in
the last 10 years, but in terms of medical problems I suspect it is extremely rare…”
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A total of 4/34 (11.76%) replied yes, 30/34 (88.24%)
replied no and 0/34 (0%) provided no answer
2. ‘Does the undergraduate medical curriculum at your
university include any speciﬁc teaching on radiation
used for the purposes of aggression (eg, nuclear
bombs, dirty bombs), and its effect(s) of human
health?’ A total of 3/34 (8.82%) replied yes, 30/34
(88.24%) replied no and 1/34 (2.94%) provided no
answer.
DISCUSSION
It is clear from these results that few undergraduate
medical students in the UK and the Republic of Ireland
currently receive any teaching about biological weapons
and bioterrorism. There may be some similarities to the
situation that has already been recognised at the United
Nations level with respect to the wider scientiﬁc research
community, namely that there are widespread deﬁcien-
cies in the education of scientists, including life scien-
tists, with respect to their background knowledge about
and understanding of bioterrorism and biowarfare and
how scientiﬁc research into this ﬁeld might lead to
adverse consequences.21
The importance of recognising such diseases in the ﬁeld
has been acknowledged in the UK. For example, in 2001,
a UK Parliament document stated that ‘Some diseases
occur so infrequently in nature that the appearance of just
one case may be suggestive of deliberate release’ and went
on to say that ‘UK clinicians are also being alerted to
watch out for tell-tale symptoms and presentations’.23
This is because if genuine instances of bioterrorism
are not identiﬁed as soon as possible, valuable time is
lost that might help to ensure that the overall impact of
such incidents is minimised and possible repeat events
prevented.
However, the ﬁrst place where persons suffering from
the effects of biological weapons are likely to interact
with doctors is in accident and emergency departments
or primary care, and the doctors who initially encounter
such persons in those settings may be likely to be rela-
tively junior or may have spent only a short time training
within specialist hospital settings.13 Furthermore, there
is currently little evidence of any research in the litera-
ture exploring whether or not more senior doctors have
had any training in this ﬁeld since qualifying.
Accordingly, if one was to wish to ensure that the
highest possible proportion of qualiﬁed doctors working
in the UK or the Republic of Ireland have acquired at
least a basic knowledge of biological weapons, bioterror-
ism and related matters by the time they start working as
doctors with the public and to avoid a knowledge
vacuum in this area, the only way this could be guaran-
teed would be for there to be some teaching incorpo-
rated into the undergraduate curriculum.
Leaving such training entirely to the postgraduate
stages, unless it is mandatory and robustly enforced, means
that a signiﬁcant number of medical graduates may never
receive any training about biological weapons and bioter-
rorism, which in turn may seriously hamper their abilities
to recognise such events for what they are as early as they
might be and alert the appropriate authorities. There
exists evidence from British accident and emergency
departments that postgraduate training and preparedness
in this ﬁeld is currently not as strong as it could be.13
Unlike in the USA, to date, very little research has been
undertaken on this subject in the UK and Ireland, and the
teams are very grateful to those colleagues at the 34
medical schools (34/38—89.47%—of those approached)
who completed the questionnaire, whether identiﬁable or
anonymous. We have no knowledge as to why four of the
organisations approached did not wish to participate.
Duplicate responses seem unlikely. Virtually, all
schools of medicine that chose to respond were happy
to provide the name of their organisation, and only two
chose to remain anonymous. Given that situation, even
if there were to be any duplicate responses, their overall
impact on the results would be small.
The issue of whether or not there could have been
any ambiguity in the questionnaire leading to confusion
among respondents must be considered.
Questions 1, 2, 7, 8 and 9 are very clear in their intent
and virtually all respondents provided answers.
In the case of question 3, ﬁve respondents gave no
answer, which, given the clarity of the wording of the ques-
tion, suggests that, at the time of answering, they did not
know if there were any plans in place, an option which was
not given to them, while they had elected not to make
further enquiries within their own medical school in order
to establish if there were any such plans in place or not—
as if they had, one would have anticipated that they would
have been able to provide a yes-or-no answer. It is not
known why respondents would not have sought to estab-
lish the internal situation within their own organisation
more clearly rather than failing to provide an answer.
Eleven respondents provided answers to question 4,
which is of interest as only six had stated in question 2 that
they provided some speciﬁc teaching on bioterrorism and
just four had answered in question 3 that there were plans
in place to introduce some teaching. These are two main
interpretations for this. First, it is possible that when they
came to question 4, while some respondents may have
recognised that their own institutions actually did provide
some teaching that was relevant to the speciﬁc areas listed,
it was not currently considered to be part of any speciﬁc
teaching on bioterrorism, but was instead a component of
other areas of teaching, for example, the clinical syndrome
caused by anthrax and/or the microbiological aspects of
anthrax might be taught as part of mainstream clinical
medicine. Second, it is possible that some respondents
answering question 4 were answering having given a yes
answer either to question 2 (‘Does the undergraduate
medical curriculum at your university include any speciﬁc
teaching on bioterrorism?’) or to question 3 (‘If no (to
question 2)—are there any plans to introduce any speciﬁc
teaching on bioterrorism?’). That said, and whatever
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answers had been given to questions 2 and 3, only 11
respondents had subsequently chosen to provide an
answer, and the answers given indicate that at the present
time only a small minority of the UK and Ireland’s
medical schools currently cover any of the speciﬁc areas of
knowledge enquired about.
Questions 5 and 6 attempted to establish if medical
schools had appropriately qualiﬁed persons on their staff
to deliver teaching on biological weapons and bioterror-
ism. Whatever be their prior answers, only seven respon-
dents answered in the afﬁrmative that they had such
persons on their staff, and only seven gave any informa-
tion regarding the speciﬁc academic areas in which their
organisations did possess such expertise. It is possible
that some respondents did not possess adequate knowl-
edge about the range of activities within their own organi-
sations to be able to provide answers regarding the
information requested—if this was the case with some, it
is not known why they chose not to seek out the necessary
information. Also, it is possible that some medical schools
currently possess absolutely no expertise whatsoever in
some, and even all, of the speciﬁc areas enquired about.
Furthermore, it should be borne in mind that even if an
individual medical school did not currently provide any
teaching about biological weapons and bioterrorism to its
undergraduate students, and even if they had no plans at
the present time to introduce any, this does not necessar-
ily mean that there would not be any persons among
their staff who do possess knowledge of the relevant
areas. Overall, it seems clear that most UK and Irish
medical schools currently do not possess high levels of
expertise in these ﬁelds of study among their staff.
Of relevance to this work is understanding why topics
relevant to biological weapons and bioterrorism are not
currently taught, and the free text responses provide
some insights into the possible reasons why this might be
the case. Free text responses from the UK make it clear
that one of the major reasons for not including bioterror-
ism in their courses is because it is not included in
‘Tomorrow’s Doctors’, the 2009 recommendations of the
UK’s General Medical Council (GMC) for what should
be included in degree courses.24 Of note is that other
documents of relevance emanating from the UK or Irish
governments and quangos, the European Union, the
United Nations and papers describing North American
experience are not mentioned in the free text responses,
the implication of this being that it may be possible that
other documents looking at this same issue but from dif-
ferent perspectives might not have been considered.
Other reasons given for not incorporating these topics
into courses include the relative rarity of such events, a
lack of time and a view that it is a postgraduate subject
and not appropriate for undergraduates. Some responses
state that they plan to look again at whether or not the
subject should be included.
The results of this survey reveal that at the moment
most UK and Irish medical schools spend relatively little
time teaching medical students about this area of
knowledge, and many do not provide any teaching at all.
Furthermore, any period of time that is allocated to
teaching would cover mainly the clinical and laboratory
elements, rather than contextualising this area of health-
care needs by providing teaching on the ethical, social,
legal and political dimensions. Furthermore, many
medical schools stated that they did not have members
of staff with particular expertise in ﬁelds associated with
the use of biological weapons and bioterrorism, a
ﬁnding that has clear implications not only for teaching
but also for research in this ﬁeld.
Furthermore, it is clear that although UK medical
schools have considerable freedom to decide what to
include within their undergraduate medical curricula, at
present many do not appear to look too far beyond
‘Tomorrow’s Doctors’, the 2009 recommendations of the
UK’s GMC,24 which currently do not give any consider-
ation to any aspect of terrorism although, interestingly,
some medical schools stated in their free text responses
that they had been prompted by this survey to look
again at the issue.
In the Republic of Ireland, the submitted responses
reveal that of the six medical schools, two included quite
substantial teaching on biological weapons and bioter-
rorism but the others do not do so. At least one Irish
medical school stated in their free text responses that
they had been prompted by receiving this survey to look
at this issue.
The world is not becoming a safer place—Harrison
and Wolf25 have calculated that between 1870 and 2001,
the frequency of wars between states increased steadily
by 2% a year on average, and in the 1990s the frequency
of wars between states rose by 36% per year, while since
9/11 terrorist attacks have continued to be common and
widespread around the world.26 While Parliament in the
UK in 2001 expressed concern over the potential for a
terrorist attack using biological weapons,24 and in 2003
the Chief Medical Ofﬁcer for England and Wales
endorsed the need to ensure that the country possessed
effective means to address the risks associated with bio-
logical agents,12 the United Nations still felt it important
to repeat similar warnings in 2012.27 Given that UK and
Irish medical schools do not just train doctors for the
UK and Ireland, maintaining a broad international per-
spective would seem important.
As things stand, while acknowledging the many
demands placed on undergraduate schools of medicine
when it comes to formulating an effective curriculum, in
the biological weaponry and bioterrorism ﬁeld, many
medical schools in the UK and the Republic of Ireland are
not currently contributing signiﬁcantly to the formal
knowledge acquisition process among their undergradu-
ates. Accordingly, if concerns still exist at the national gov-
ernmental and supragovernmental levels, it may be wise
for this matter to be revisited and examined by the rele-
vant agencies, such as the GMC and the HSE (Ireland),14
and any gaps in teaching skills, research activity and
funding that cause concern identiﬁed and remedied.
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Furthermore, in 2003, the Chief Medical Ofﬁcer for
England and Wales also highlighted the importance of
ensuring that the country has the means to deal effect-
ively with the risks posed by chemical and radiation
hazards,12 and the widespread absence of teaching time
spent on weaponised chemicals and the use of radiation
as a weapon suggest that the situation may be similar to
bioterrorism, although more work would be needed to
establish the present overall situation.
With respect to the strengths of this work, this is the
ﬁrst study in either the UK or the Republic of Ireland to
look at this issue, and the response rate was very high.
The main limitation is that not all medical schools pro-
vided responses to all the questions posed, and the
reasons for this are currently not known.
The survey provides sufﬁcient data to indicate that
more in-depth studies are warranted to establish more
clearly if it is in the best interests of the public and
patients for clinicians to be receiving at least some teach-
ing about biological weapons and other WMD at under-
graduate level, or if keeping the current system of leaving
such training until the postgraduate stages of training is
the most effective option. In addition, while many
researchers joining the WMD research community (of
whom a proportion will be medically-trained clinicians)
enter it at the Masters and Doctorate levels, the afore-
mentioned high-level concerns reported regarding the
existing deﬁciencies in the education of researchers with
respect to their background knowledge about and the
understanding of bioterrorism and biowarfare, and how
the research into this ﬁeld is undertaken and the results
disseminated21 indicate that research designed to deter-
mine the best stages in researchers’ careers to introduce
more training about and deeper insights into the
broader issues surrounding WMD, as well as to monitor
the efﬁcacy of such training, would be valuable. For
example, it may be that earlier, improved and augmented
training of all medically trained individuals working
within research teams engaged in studying WMD-related
topics represents one way of improving on what is consid-
ered by some to be the currently unacceptable situation.
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